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BRINGING DEAD CAPITAL TO LIFE: 
INTERNATIONAL MANDATES FOR LAND 
TITLING IN BRAZIL 
John C. Martin* 
Abstract: Economist Hernando de Soto urges land re-titling programs 
in developing countries so that squatting farmers and businesspeople 
may be integrated into a lawful economy. Re-titling programs, however, 
can go awry, fueling class and racial backlash, and undermining eco-
nomic stability and trust in property titles. This Note explores the risks 
and challenges Brazil faces in expropriating and re-titling land occupied 
by squatters. It addresses the legality of expropriation under interna-
tional law, draws comparisons with land reform in the United States and 
Zimbabwe, and addresses the specific hurdles Brazil faces concerning its 
Constitution, civil code, and judicial system. This Note proposes a legal 
solution resembling the U.S. Homestead Act. It would involve expropri-
ating land for less than fair market value in order to facilitate a more 
equal distribution of land and to temper the risk of racial backlash. 
Introduction 
 On February 12, 2005, Sister Dorothy Stang, a Catholic nun and 
native of Dayton, Ohio, was shot four times in the chest and head by a 
pair of gunmen at a rural encampment in Pará, Brazil.1 Since the 
1970s, Sister Dorothy, backed by the Pastoral Land Commission of the 
Roman Catholic Church, had championed land tenure for Brazilian 
landless peasants.2 The investigation following Stang’s murder found 
that two land-owning ranchers had hired the gunmen, apparently in 
retaliation for her years of opposition to their economic and political 
domination of land interests in Brazil.3 
 The facts surrounding Sister Dorothy’s murder illustrate the in-
tractable positions of these opposing forces and the inevitable escala-
                                                                                                                      
* John C. Martin is the Executive Articles Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 See Larry Rohter, Brazil Promises Crackdown After Nun’s Shooting Death, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
14, 2005, at A3. 
2 See id. 
3 See Supporters of Slain American Nun Vow to Pursue Planners of Killing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
12, 2005, at A13. 
122 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:121 
tion of their conflict.4 Sister Dorothy committed years of her life to the 
cause of impoverished landless peasants, and finally gave up her life for 
it.5 The Brazilian landowners resorted to the cold-hearted murder of an 
aged nun—and risked prison and personal ruin for themselves—in 
their quest to silence all resistance to their powerful monopoly of land 
use.6 For now, the landowners retain their position of control and 
dominance. 7 Yet, community organizations  in Brazil have organized 
themselves, lobbied governments, and successfully opposed landown-
ers, demonstrating that a “backlash” against the dominant landowning 
minority in Brazil is on the rise.8 
 Amy Chua, in World on Fire, warned that an explosive backlash 
might occur in democracies like Brazil, where dominant minorities 
hold a majority of the country’s wealth, and where politicians might 
benefit politically from supporting the marginalized majority.9 Chua 
shows how a dramatic, swift, and violent backlash occurred in Zim-
babwe against the white landowning elite.10 The same could be Bra-
zil’s fate, Chua suggests, if free elections continue and the poor suc-
cessfully pressure the government to expropriate private property.11 
 Hernando de Soto offers an alternative to Chua’s scenario in The 
Mystery of Capital.12 In a variation of land reform, De Soto recom-
mends land titling schemes as a solution for poverty in developing 
countries like Brazil and Zimbabwe.13 
 This Note will summarize Chua’s predictions of backlash in coun-
tries like Brazil, and demonstrate how de Soto’s proposals on land ti-
tling may serve as a plausible solution. After an examination of interna-
tional rights to property and standards on expropriation, this Note will 
explain how Brazil presents a unique challenge for domestic reformers. 
In Brazil, as in Zimbabwe five years ago, land distribution is so un-
equal—and past land reform has been so unsuccessful—a violent class 
and racial backlash to force land redistribution could be just around 
the corner. The best solution for Brazil, beyond allowing the market to 
dictate the cost of expropriations, may be to permit expropriation for 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See Amy Chua, World on Fire 74 (2003). 
9 See id. at 6–10. 
10 See id. at 127–31. 
11 See id. at 160–62. 
12 See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital 5–7 (2000). 
13 See id. 
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just, but not fair market prices, and to clarify the laws on when land 
may be expropriated and re-titled to landless squatters. 
I. Background 
A. Chua and de Soto 
 Chua warns that when the majority of a state’s population feels 
disenfranchised vis-à-vis a “market dominant minority,” backlash often 
results.14 Backlash occurred in Zimbabwe with invasions of whites’ 
farms.15 Majority rule voting, Chua observes, may empower strongmen 
like Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe.16 These strongmen rely 
on widespread hatred of a powerful, but minority sub-group as the basis 
of their political power.17 
 De Soto proposes that backlash, among other problems, would 
best be confronted by land titling programs.18 De Soto notes that land-
owners in the West can easily “tap” their property, because individuals, 
banks, and courts of law recognize land titles.19 Large tracts of property 
in the developing world are used productively by squatters, but officially 
belong to large landholders.20 Thus this property cannot be “tapped” as 
collateral for loans and a fuel for savings and investment.21 Conversely, 
land titling programs would unlock more capital than can be given in 
foreign aid, empower the poor, and reinforce democratic participa-
tion.22 
 As evidence for his claims, de Soto cites the history of land titling 
in the United States.23 The U.S. Homestead Act allowed settlers to buy 
land for practically nothing, as long as they agreed to settle and culti-
vate it.24 Although it sacrificed strict adherence to property rights, the 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Chua, supra note 8, at 6. 
15 See id. at 127–31. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 259–64. 
18 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 5–7. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 40. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 226–27. 
23 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 107. 
24 See id. at 107–08; see also Amy Callard, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Produc-
tion Company: A Conflict over What Killed the Canary?, 33 Tulsa L.J. 909, 915–16 (1998) 
(comparing economic effects of Homestead Act with Coal Lands Act). 
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Act encouraged the development of land on the American frontier 
and empowered individuals with a sense of ownership and identity.25 
 De Soto suggests that land titling in Brazil might similarly em-
power Brazilians with a sense of personal ownership, and of member-
ship in a democratic system.26 Like the Homestead Act, land titling 
could help to stem backlash and reinforce democratic institutions.27 
B. Land Reform and Expropriation as a Matter of International Law 
 The United Nations (U.N.) Declaration of Human Rights de-
clares a universal right to housing,28 and numerous theorists and in-
ternational forums have agreed that there should be a universal right 
to property.29 John Locke went as far as saying that defending prop-
erty rights is the central role and purpose of governments.30 
 Expropriation means a governmental taking or modification of 
individual property rights, particularly by eminent domain.31 Expro-
priation is distinct from redistribution.32 Although a government may 
expropriate land, say, to save a rain forest from de-forestation, it may 
choose not to redistribute land by re-titling it to individuals or groups.33 
 There are many benefits of expropriating land for re-titling.34 It 
may lead to increased investment and growth when land is tapped as 
collateral, increased state tax revenues, a sense of ownership among the 
people, increased individual participation in the democratic process, 
and the development of additional rights.35 It may lead to increased 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil 
and in the United States, 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 435, 469–70 (2006). 
26 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 218–21; see also Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road 
to Democracy? 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 691, 702 (2006) (noting that land titling increases local 
control over politics). 
27 See Chua, supra note 8, at 267–68. 
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
29 See Jonathan Shirley, Note, The Role of International Human Rights and the Law of Dip-
lomatic Protection in Resolving Zimbabwe’s Land Crisis, 27 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 163, 168 
(2004); see also Kevin E. Colby, Brazil and the MST: Land Reform and Human Rights, 16 N.Y. 
Int’l L. Rev. 1, 14-17 (2003) (discussing several international instruments that provide for 
right to property). 
30 See Rose, supra note 26, at 701–02. 
31 Black’s Law Dictionary 265 (2d ed. 2001). 
32 See Colby, supra note 29, at 2–3. 
33 See, e.g., Brazil Carves out 2 Vast Preserves in the Amazon Rain Forest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 
2005, at A5. 
34 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
35 See Rose, supra note 26, at 704 (discussing creation of agents of democracy through 
land titling). 
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productivity of land by removing absent landlords.36 Finally, it may help 
to empower agents of democracy when the people pressure govern-
ments for land re-titling.37 
 International customary law allows expropriation that is: (1) for a 
public purpose; (2) nondiscriminatory; and (3) justly compensated.38 
Conflicts in international cases and arbitration usually center on 
whether compensation satisfies the third criterion.39 
C. Land Reform in Brazil 
 As early as 1964, during a period of dictatorship in Brazil, the gov-
ernment recognized the need for land reform and passed the Land 
Statute.40 The Land Statute provides that the government may expro-
priate “latifundia,” large landholdings with their roots in colonial 
grants of land.41 The statute requires three elements to be satisfied for a 
lawful expropriation: (1) the land must be unproductive; (2) the ex-
propriation must be in the public interest; (3) the expropriation must 
be for compensation.42 
 The 1988 Constitution, which followed the overthrow of military 
dictatorship, further validated government expropriations.43 Article 184 
reads: “[i]t is within the power of the Union to expropriate on account 
of social interest, for purposes of land reform, the rural property which 
is not performing its social function.”44 Article 183 also creates a flexi-
ble adverse possession law in urban properties, requiring only five years 
of adverse possession for title to transfer.45 Another important post-
                                                                                                                      
36 Thomas Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Liberdad: The Social Function Doctrine 
and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 69, 112 (2006). 
37 See Rose, supra note 26, at 704. 
38 See Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Interlocutory Award in Case Concerning Sedco, Inc., 
and Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. and Iran, 25 Int’l Legal Materials 629, 631 (1986) [hereinafter 
Iran-United States Claims]. 
39 See Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach to Address 
an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 557, 582 (2003). 
40 See Pindell, supra note 25, at 451. 
41 See id. 
42 See Bradley S. Romig, Agriculture in Brazil and the Landless Movement: A Government’s 
Attempt to Balance Agricultural Success and Collateral Damage, 11 Drake J. Agric. L. 81, 94 
(2006). 
43 See Pindell, supra note 25, at 453. 
44 See Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 184 (1988), available at http:// 
www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleVII.html (Braz.) (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). 
45 See id. art. 183; see also Pindell, supra note 25, at 456 (discussing effects of flexible ad-
verse possession law on favela property market). 
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Revolution measure, the City Statute, allows for ownership rights in the 
favela to shift after brief periods of squatting.46 
 Complicating matters, the Brazilian Civil Code, which has re-
mained unchanged since 1916, guarantees property rights and treats 
any infringement on property rights as a compensable taking of prop-
erty.47 Brazilian courts have relied on the strong defense of private 
property in Civil Code when adjudicating land disputes, requiring that 
expropriation be met with fair market compensation.48 This makes ex-
propriations exceedingly expensive, preventing widespread land re-
form and rendering the Constitution’s plea for expropriations practi-
cally meaningless.49 
 Nevertheless, grassroots organizations have resorted to self-help to 
enforce the Constitution.50 The Moviemento Sem Terra (MST), or 
Landless Worker’s Movement, is the most organized and disciplined 
manifestation of a land reform movement.51 The MST routinely makes 
threats of prolonged land invasions, so-called “red months,” to pressure 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), and the Brazilian govern-
ment, to step up land reform measures.52 Its stated goal is to pressure 
the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) 
to use its authority under the Constitution to expropriate the land and 
re-title it to squatting peasants.53 
 When the MST invades land and sets up squatting communities, 
INCRA often responds by expropriating more land. The INCRA helped 
37,000 families get land in 2003.54 Nevertheless, this falls well below the 
Lula and Cardoso governments’ stated goals of expropriation and re-
titling.55 
 The landowners have retaliated by challenging INCRA expropria-
tions in court, and by engaging in self-help.56 Violent reprisals against 
MST land invasions have resulted in arrests, and thousands of alleged 
“assassinations” of MST activists.57 The MST website reports 969 assassi-
                                                                                                                      
46 See Pindell, supra note 25, at 452–54. 
47 Law No. 3,071 of Jan. 1, 1916, Book II, tit. I, chs. II, III, & V, Código Civil [C.C.] 
[Civil Code] (Braz.). 
48 See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 570. 
49 See id. 
50 See Colby, supra note 29, at 3. 
51 See id. at 19. 
52 See Romig, supra note 42, at 96. 
53 See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 569–70. 
54 See Romig, supra note 42, at 98. 
55 See id. (noting that State’s goal was 530,000 families resettled by end of Lula’s term). 
56 See id. at 94–95. 
57 See id. 
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nations of rural workers and MST activists between 1985 and 1996.58 
On April 17, 1996, the Brazilian police shot into a crowd of peaceful 
MST protesters, killing 19 and injuring 51.59 The police shooting and 
other acts of violence show the bloody side of MST confrontations over 
land titling policies.60 
D. Note on Structural Differences Between Zimbabwe and Brazil 
 Brazilian rule of law, politics, and society differ substantially from 
Zimbabwe’s, making direct comparisons over-simplistic.61 Chua calls 
Mugabe a strongman, who has taken advantage of popular backlash 
against whites and the weak rule of law to gain power.62 By defending 
the rights of a black majority against a white landowning minority, 
Mugabe wins popular elections and consolidates political power.63 
 Zimbabwe’s judicial branch is weak: the Supreme Court’s declara-
tion that Mugabe’s land grabs were illegal went unheeded.64 Further-
more, although Mugabe’s modifications of Zimbabwe’s Constitution 
provided a veneer of legality to expropriations without compensation, 
the modifications ignore customary international customary law on 
expropriation.65 
 In contrast, Brazil’s democratic institutions are energized by more 
than majority voting.66 Most Brazilians express faith in the judicial sys-
tem and the rule of law.67 Participation in elections is high, and grass-
roots organizations maintain an effective dialogue with the govern-
                                                                                                                      
58 Mark S. Langevin & Peter Rosset, Land Reform from Below: The Landless Workers Move-
ment in Brazil, http://www.mstbrazil.org/rosset.html. 
59 See Alessandra Bastos, Brazil’s Landless Back to Highway Where They Were Massacred 10 
Years Ago, Brazzil Mag., Apr. 17, 2006, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/ 
view/6113/53. 
60 See Marc Margolis, A Plot on Their Own, Newsweek Int’l, Jan. 21, 2002, at 22. 
61 See Colby, supra note 29, at 23–25. 
62 See Chua, supra note 8, at 128–30. 
63 See id. 
64 See Shirley, supra note 29, at 164–65. 
65 See Craig J. Richardson, The Loss of Property Rights and the Collapse of Zimbabwe, 25 Ca-
to J. 541, 541–43 (2005); David Shriver, Rectifying Land Ownership Disparities Through Expro-
priation: Why Recent Land Reform Measures in Namibia are Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 15 
Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Prob. 419, 433–34 (2005). 
66 See Chua, supra note 8, at 259–60. 
67 See Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts, and Social Change in 
Latin America, 16 Fla. J. Int’l L. 133, 136–37 (2004)(describing role of Latin American 
constitutions on political processes); Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in 
Mexico, 21 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 715, 718, 812 (2004) (noting that just 28.8% of Brazil-
ians have no confidence in legal system). 
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ment.68 Furthermore, Brazilian domestic rule on expropriation pro-
vides greater protection for property rights than the international rule 
of expropriation requires.69 
II. Discussion 
A. The Failure of a Constitution to Implement Standards in  
International Human Rights 
 The failure of Brazil’s government to expropriate and re-title land 
effectively may have led to the systematic denial of personal rights 
granted under international law to landless Brazilians.70 International 
human rights standards ensure the right to housing, food, and a decent 
living, which are implicitly denied when governmental policies rein-
force the concentration of land in the hands of a few.71 Although land 
ownership is less unequal today than in the past, it remains that one 
half of Brazil’s fertile land is owned by only one percent of the nation’s 
farmers.72 Similarly, the Gini coefficient for Brazil, measuring overall 
inequality, has been increasing in Brazil over the last few decades (i.e. 
inequality in income has increased).73 These numbers suggest that in-
ternational human rights are being denied to landless Brazilians.74 
 The Constitution implicitly recognizes international human 
rights to housing, food, and a living by providing that the government 
has a right to expropriate land if it is not put to “productive use.”75 Yet 
Brazilian courts have held that landowners can establish “productive 
use” by clearing the land for cattle grazing.76 This rule has resulted in 
decreased opportunities for expropriation, as well as increased defor-
estation.77 Critics of these decisions point out that they reflect a land 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Romig, supra note 42, at 96–98. 
69 See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 559, 569. 
70 See Colby, supra note 29, at 15. 
71 See UDHR, supra note 28, art. 25; Colby, supra note 29, at 15. 
72 See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 564 (largest two percent of landholdings occupy 57 
percent of agricultural land, usually along race lines, while smallest 30 percent of farms 
occupy one percent of agricultural land). 
73 See Brazilian Gov’t, Agrarian Reform: Brazil’s Commitment, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
publi_04/COLECAO/AGRAIN3.HTM (last visited Jan. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Agrarian 
Reform]. 
74 See Ankerson & Ruppert, supra note 36, at 70, 88, 102. 
75 See Colby, supra note 29, at 12–13. 
76 See Romig, supra note 42, at 94. 
77 See id. 
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reform policy focused more on resettlement and colonization of the 
Amazon region, than on the redistribution of large land holdings.78 
 Furthermore, since Brazilian courts uphold the 1916 Civil Code’s 
protections of existing property rights, insisting on providing only fair 
market value compensation to large landowners, expropriation actions 
by INCRA have become prohibitively expensive.79 Thus, the Constitu-
tion’s promise to expropriate any land not put to productive use has 
been rendered effectively meaningless.80 
B. Land Cannot Be Tapped as Collateral for Loans, Investment, and Growth 
 The Brazilian government’s failure to engage in effective land 
titling programs has left vast tracts of property “untapped” for use as 
collateral for loans.81 Currently, there are more than one million 
squatters in Brazil, the majority of which are small farmers.82 In de 
Soto’s terms, the houses on these plots, the parcels of land being 
worked, and the merchandise being bought and sold by the squatters 
cannot be put into economic motion.83 If recognized under legal title, 
these units of value could be used as collateral for loans, leading to a 
multiplying effect through added investment, growth in relative value, 
increased tax revenue, and increased funding for infrastructure.84 Be-
cause the squatters’ land cannot be used as collateral for loans, there 
is no multiplying effect, and thus the land remains “dead capital.”85 
C. Improper Land Reform Policies Can Be Counterproductive 
 Land reform policy, when poorly conceived, can defeat the very 
economic and philosophical goals it hopes to achieve.86 This was the 
case in Zimbabwe, where the economy plummeted due to a lack of 
confidence in the security of property titles.87 The transition from 
commercial to communal farming caused increased land erosion, de-
                                                                                                                      
78 See Mitchell, supra note 29, at 572. 
79 Id. Land reform has cost between $8000 and $57,000 per beneficiary depending on 
the region. See id. 
80 See Colby, supra note 29, at 12–13. 
81 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 40. 
82 See Agrarian Reform, supra note 73. 
83 See de Soto, supra note 12, at 40. 
84 See id. at 40–42. 
85 See id. 
86 In Zimbabwe, agricultural production between 2000 and 2003 declined from be-
tween fifty and ninety percent as a result of the departure of skilled farmers and an in-
crease in unused land. See Richardson, supra note 65, at 548–54. 
87 See id. 
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creased production, and forced Zimbabweans into a “subsistence form 
of living.”88 This raises concerns that the same might occur in Brazil.89 
 There are several reasons to question the wisdom of redistribut-
ing land into the hands of the MST.90 The landless often settle on 
poor quality land that requires expensive technology to develop.91 
Lacking funds, the recently-settled often experience widespread farm 
failures.92 Large scale farming operations generally possess the tech-
nology, skills, and equipment needed to improve poor quality land, 
while small farmers usually do not.93 
 In addition, undermining private property rights may defeat the 
chief purposes for which governments are held to exist, to protect pri-
vate property.94 Under command economies, which arose under the 
doctrines of communism and authoritarianism, property, and hence 
power, was concentrated in the hands of a few.95 Concentration of 
power led to oppression, and eventually many of these regimes failed or 
were overthrown.96 By contrast, a democratic system with property 
rights allows land, and hence power, to be dispersed.97 This limits the 
opportunities for elites to oppress individual property owners, and rein-
forces the legitimacy of the regime.98 
 The hope of any titling program is that it will lead to increases in 
savings, investment, and land use efficiency.99 If improperly applied, 
these very programs may lead to the opposite result.100 Where private 
property rights have been the most fluid, the Brazilian favela, investors 
and property owners alike have lost confidence in land titles, becoming 
resigned to the presence of squatters.101 There, year requirements for 
adverse possession have been eased under the City Statute, and confi-
dence in land titles has been undermined.102 As a result, favela land-
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 572. 
92 See id. 
93 See Richardson, supra note 65, at 551–53. 
94 See Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 36, at 93. 
95 See Rose, supra note 26, at 705. 
96 See id. at 691–92. 
97 See id. at 705–06. 
98 See id. at 702. 
99 See Richardson, supra note 65, at 543–45. 
100 See id. at 548. 
101 See Pindell, supra note 25, at 456. 
102 See id. at 454. 
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owners are unlikely to receive loans on their properties.103 The pur-
poses of a land titling program would certainly not be achieved if prop-
erty rights were rendered as fluid as those in the Brazilian favela.104 
 Furthermore, the political and social pressures land groups apply 
on the government raise significant questions about the role of grass-
roots organizations in the democratic process.105 The MST relies alter-
natively on lawful mechanisms and self-help.106 Commentators suggest 
that the MST’s stated goal of enforcing the government’s policies 
should not be viewed as social disobedience.107 Yet, should one over-
look the MST’s threats of violence, its lawlessness, and its increasing 
resort to land invasions?108 Critics hold that in resorting to self-help, the 
MST violates property rights and human rights.109 
D. The Emerging Backlash 
 The race and class backlash against the dominant market minor-
ity in Brazil is becoming more pronounced.110 Brazil has a burgeoning 
Black Power movement that could fuel racial backlash.111 Although 
Brazilians still claim that their “racial democracy” implies the absence 
of racial distinctions, income inequality between races is increasing.112 
 Will the tension between the landless and the landowners lead to a 
repeat of the violence that was observed in Zimbabwe in the decades 
leading up to Mugabe’s land grabs?113 Like Zimbabweans, Brazilians 
perceive that white European settlers received broad tracts of land 
while dark-skinned settlers received nothing.114 There, resentment 
against white landowners continued to grow until the situation ex-
ploded and widespread land invasions, violence, and evictions oc-
                                                                                                                      
103 See id. at 456. 
104 See id. 
105 See Romig, supra note 42, at 94. 
106 See Colby, supra note 29, at 23–25. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id; see also Margolis, supra note 60 (describing violence during April 17, 1996 
shootings). 
110 See Chua, supra note 8, at 160–62. 
111 See id. at 74–75 (describing Brazil’s first-ever Black-only political party and emer-
gence of Black power organizations). 
112 See Larry J. Obhof, Why Globalization? A Look at Global Capitalism and its Effects, 15 U. 
Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 91, 103 (2003). 
113 See Chua, supra note 8, at 127. 
114 See Colby, supra note 29, at 27 n.132. 
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curred.115 This type of racial backlash has not yet occurred in Brazil, 
but it might if resentful minorities are not soon appeased.116 
 Will the MST devolve into a proponent of racial backlash?117 On 
the surface, race does not appear to be a motivating factor for land 
invasions in Brazil.118 Centuries of inter-marriage have blurred racial 
distinctions, making “Black versus White” backlash less likely.119 Nev-
ertheless, race-based groups champion the same causes as the MST, 
and together engage in acts of social disobedience to pressure the 
government to expropriate and redistribute land.120 
 Most importantly for the prospects of backlash, majority senti-
ment can shape elections in Brazil, just as it did in Zimbabwe.121 The 
MST officially backed Lula as its candidate for land reform during the 
October 2006 runoff election, and vows to hold him accountable by 
staging land invasions.122 Lula, himself from a very poor family, em-
bodies the class backlash against the rich landowning elite.123 
III. Analysis 
A. Implementing International Law in Brazil 
 This Note proposes two changes to Brazilian law that are reasoned 
to facilitate effective land re-titling and the safeguarding of interna-
tional human rights standards without undermining the rule of law and 
faith in property titles. In order for the courts to implement these re-
forms, the Brazilian legislature would have to revise the Civil Code or 
clarify how articles 183 and 184 of the Constitution should be inter-
preted.124  First, as environmental and legal scholars have insisted, the 
rule developed by Brazilian land courts that allows “productive use” to 
be made out by clear-cutting land should be eliminated.125 Squatters 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Chua, supra note 8, at 127 (noting that Mugabe stated, “Our party [the Zanu-
PF] must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man—our real enemy. The white 
man is not indigenous to Africa.”). 
116 See id. 
117 See Colby, supra note 29, at 23–25. 
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should not be precluded from claiming title to land merely because the 
land has been hastily cleared by a landowner.126 Allowing the produc-
tive use requirement to be satisfied by clearing land not only keeps land 
in the hands of a few, but provides an incentive for landowners to de-
forest land.127 
 Second, Brazilian legislature should require that expropriations 
by INCRA be upheld as long as compensation is “just.”128 The vast 
inequalities in land ownership,129 the risk of class and racial backlash, 
as well as the potential to stimulate savings, investment, and business 
growth, demand a land re-titling program that the state can realisti-
cally pursue.130 At the same time, a flexible standard for determining 
“just” compensation must also be developed: such a standard would 
enable the lawful redistribution of unproductive, unused landhold-
ings, while discouraging unlawful land invasions.131 
 Just compensation might be determined by considering the factors 
that de Soto deems to justify re-titling in the first place: the degree to 
which squatters use the land productively; the economic value that 
would be produced by legitimizing title to land; the concentration of 
landownership relative to the number of squatters; and the fairness of 
compensation to the particular landowner given the history of latifun-
dia land grants.132 Such a factor-based standard would admittedly allow 
for subjective determinations of compensation, and should therefore 
be replaced with an objective standard as landownership becomes less 
concentrated and more in line with international human rights stan-
dards.133 A court might also consider whether re-titling the land would 
legitimate violent land reprisals, and refuse to re-title land cheaply 
when it would have the effect of encouraging unlawful seizures.134 
 Allowing for expropriations to be upheld as long as compensa-
tion is “just” would be justified in Brazil even if it would not be in the 
United States: In Brazil, land is more unequally distributed, the risk of 
backlash is more pronounced, and the Brazilian Constitution actually 
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provides for the redistribution of land.135 Moreover, many developed 
countries have had successful land reform policies with less than fair 
market value compensation for expropriated land.136 Allowing for 
“just” compensation would in fact provide for higher compensation 
than the U.S. Homestead Act, which in many cases allowed settlers to 
assume title to land without any monetary compensation.137 
B. Avoiding the Backlash 
 Redistributing land will decrease the chances for conflict be-
tween landowners and dark-skinned landless poor.138 Diffusing prop-
erty titles will spread power and ownership among many individuals, 
making concentration of power and oppression less likely.139 Because 
land gives rights, and with it power, Brazilians would not be as vulner-
able to landowner reprisals if they actually owned unquestioned title 
to land.140 Having title to land would also legitimize democratic gov-
ernment by increasing faith in election outcomes and giving a sense 
of ownership in the country.141 Creating Brazilian “agents of democ-
racy,” land titling would liberate the “orphaned” class of landless from 
their misery by giving them the means to support themselves and 
their families.142 Concurrently, international human rights to a decent 
living, food, and housing, would be secured.143 
 Conversely, if Brazil fails to implement effective re-titling pro-
grams, it risks racial backlash.144 Without land titling, the landless’ 
viewpoints are less likely to be heard, indigent populations have little 
buffer between themselves and the State, and little incentive exists to 
aspire for greater liberties.145 
 The MST is emerging as a powerful voice of backlash.146 Al-
though they do not cite race as a motivating factor for their land inva-
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sions, Black power organizations champion the same causes as the 
MST.147 The intersection of causes supported by race-based and class-
based groups indicates that they share the same grievances, and that 
‘class’ and ‘race’ divisions are readily interchangeable.148 The MST 
could develop into a mass resistance movement against landowners.149 
 Comfortingly, a relatively strong judiciary and the majority’s re-
spect for the rule of law prevent the rapid rise of a strongman like 
Mugabe.150 Nevertheless, as racial conflict increases, legal changes to 
the property titling system and a loosening of the rule of expropria-
tion would help prevent the backlash that looms.151 
C. Expect Resistance from Landowners 
 Since land reform began with the Land Statute of 1964, land-
owners have exerted political pressure to prevent reforms from being 
effective.152 Landowners continue to refute the MST’s interpretation 
of the Constitution, emphasizing the Constitution’s protection of pri-
vate property rights.153 Guided by these arguments, landowners have 
challenged ninety-five percent of INCRA expropriations.154 Yet, if Bra-
zil’s law-makers took strong action to clarify the laws on expropriation 
and productive use requirements, these costly legal battles could be 
avoided, and valid expropriations under the Constitution could pro-
ceed in spite of landowner resistance.155 
D. Encouraging Economic Growth 
 By re-titling land, Brazil can avoid the failures of Zimbabwe and 
achieve the increase in economic growth and investment de Soto pre-
dicted.156 In Zimbabwe, investors lost confidence in Mugabe’s gov-
ernment after it disregarded the Supreme Court’s declaration of the 
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illegality of land seizures.157 Yet in Brazil, the judicial branch is widely 
respected.158 In addition, because Zimbabweans were not given title to 
the land, but instead forced to lease the land from the government, 
they could not use the land as collateral for loans and investment.159 
In contrast, direct land titling programs, if properly applied, would 
give title to individuals, thereby avoiding the problems that doomed 
the Zimbabwean effort.160 
Conclusion 
 Currently, the specter of ethnic conflict in Brazil is testing the 
State’s devotion to international law, which calls for the implementa-
tion of universal norms and procedures. Brazil has hosted interna-
tional conferences before to establish the political and civil rights of 
its indigent people, but these discussions, although well-meaning, 
have not gone far enough. Brazil must now take steps to carry out the 
promises made in its Constitution to expropriate and re-title land, 
only then will the mandate of international human rights be satisfied. 
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